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THE 2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: 
ARCHETYPE OR EXCEPTION? 
Michael C. Dorf* 
WHEN ELECTIONS GO BAD: THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY AND THE 
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 2000. By Samuel lssacharoff, Pamela S. 
Karlan and Richard H. Pi/des. New York: Foundation Press. 2001. Pp. 
iv, 172. Paper. $9.95. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The day after the Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. Gore,1 a 
colleague who specializes in tax law approached me with mock sympa­
thy. "It must be very discouraging trying to teach constitutional law," 
he said, "when it's so obviously made up." This view of the Court's de­
cision remains widely held, at least within the academy and among 
those who did not vote for President Bush. Unlike many of my fellow 
Democrats and academic colleagues, however, I see no reason to 
question the motives of the majority (or dissenting) Justices in Bush v. 
Gore. I certainly do not think that the case casts doubt upon the very 
possibility of principled constitutional adjudication. Nonetheless, I 
share the widespread view that the justifications the Court offered for 
its decision were quite unconvincing, and for that reason I have diffi­
culty believing that the case will, as it were, have legs. Bush v. Gore is 
an important case because of the stakes of the controversy it resolved, 
not because of the legal principles it announced. 
By contrast, Samuel Issacharoff,2 Pamela Karlan,3 and Richard 
Pildes4 take the case seriously as a source of legal doctrine. They use it 
as the centerpiece of a legal primer on the difficulties surrounding af-
* Vice Dean and Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law. - Ed. I am 
very grateful to Benjamin Alpers, Richard Briffault, Neil Buchanan, and Sherry Colb for 
comments on a draft of this Review, and to Scott Chesin for research assistance. Parts of the 
Introduction to this Review are adapted from a column that first appeared on Findlaw's Le­
gal Commentary, at http://writ.findlaw.com (last visited May 10, 2001). 
1. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
2. Harold R. Medina Professor in Procedural Jurisprudence, Columbia University 
School of Law. 
3. Kenneth and Harle Montgomery Professor of Public Interest Law, Stanford Law 
School. 
4. Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. 
1279 
1280 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 99:1279 
ter-the-fact judicial review of election procedures. In its fair and bal­
anced exposition of prior precedent and the legislative history of the 
key provisions upon which the Supreme Court purported to rely in 
Bush v. Gore, When Elections Go Bad provides the Court with all the 
rope it needs to hang itself.5 
Yet the book's very structure implies that Bush v. Gore reflects the 
dilemmas that generally and inevitably arise when courts are asked to 
adjudicate election disputes. It does not. Bush v. Gore is sui generis. 
Because of its remarkable role in deciding a remarkable election, 
however, the case is clearly worth studying closely, apart from any 
general lessons one might choose to draw from it. Although When 
Elections Go Bad presents the courts as struggling with recurring di­
lemmas, its real strength is the light it sheds on the performance of the 
U.S. Supreme Court in the Presidential election of 2000. 
In Bush v. Gore, the Court's most conservative Justices announced 
an interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause so broad that, if gen­
erally applied, it would sweep aside election procedures in a majority 
of American states. A manual recount of punch card ballots was held 
unconstitutional because the statutory phrase "intent of the voter" was 
deemed insufficiently precise to constrain the discretion of vote count­
ers.6 Yet three fundamental errors marred the Court's analysis. 
5. But perhaps not all the rope that one might want. In my view, the book edits Bush v. 
Gore a bit too severely. This is my only quibble about the editing, and, happily, the authors 
will correct the defect in a second edition of When Elections Go Bad, already nearly com­
plete as this Review goes to press. 
6. 531 U.S. at 105 ("The recount mechanisms implemented in response to the decisions 
of the Florida Supreme Court do not satisfy the minimum requirement for non-arbitrary 
treatment of voters necessary to secure the fundamental right. Florida's basic command for 
the count of legally cast votes is to consider the 'intent of the voter.' This is unobjectionable 
as an abstract proposition and a starting principle. The problem inheres in the absence of 
specific standards to ensure its equal application."). The Florida Supreme Court's holding, 
Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1257 (2000) ("[W)e conclude that a legal vote is one in 
which there is a 'clear indication of the intent of the voter.' "), derived its standard from 
FLA. STAT. ch. 101.5614(5) (2000) ("No vote shall be declared invalid or void if there is a 
clear indication of the intent of the voter as determined by the canvassing board."). Manual 
recount statutes are in place in at least twenty-one states other than Florida. See, e. g. , CAL. 
ELEC. CODE§ 15627 (West 1996); COLO. REV. STAT.§ 1-10.5-102(3) (2000); 10 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. § 5/24A-15.l (2000); IND. CODE § 3-12-3-13 (1998); IOWA CODE ANN. § 50.48(4) 
(1999); KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 25-3107(b) (2000); MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. § 13-4 (1957); MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ch. 54, § 135B (2000); MINN. R. 8235.1000 (West 2001); MONT. CODE ANN.§ 
13-16-414(3) (1999); NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-1119(6) (1998); NEV. REV. STAT. § 293.404(3) 
(2000); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 19:53A-14 (1999); 25 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 3031.18 (1994); 
S.D. ADMIN. R. 5:02:09:05(5) (West 2001); TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 212.005( d) (1986); VT. 
STAT. ANN. § 26011 (1982); VA. CODE § 24.2-802(C) (1950); W. VA. CODE§ 3-4A-28(4) 
(1999); WIS. STAT. § 5.90 (1997-1998). See Respondent's Brief at 41 n.19, Bush, 531 U.S. 98 
(No. 00-949). In most of these states, "intent of the voter" standards are the norm. See, e. g. , 
IND. CODE § 3-12-1-1; TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 127.130(d)(4), (e) (requiring vote to be 
counted if "indentation" on chad or other mark indicates clearly ascertainable intent of the 
voter); Stapleton v. Bd. of Elections, 821 F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1987); Democratic Party. v. Bd. of 
Elections, 649 F. Supp. 1549, 1552 (D.V.I. 1986); Delahunt v. Johnston, 671 N.E.2d 1241 
(Mass. 1996); Pullen v. Mulligan, 561 N.E.2d 585, 611 (Ill. 1990); Hickel v. Thomas, 588 P.2d 
273, 274 (Alaska 1978); Wright v. Gettinger, 428 N.E.2d 1212, 1225 (Ind. 1981). 
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First, the majority Justices apparently assumed that the alternative 
to an imperfect manual recount was a perfect measure of the will of 
the Florida electorate. Yet intercounty variations in the accuracy with 
which different forms of balloting recorded voters' intent dwarfed the 
variations introduced by the ambiguity of the recount standard.7 The 
Court brushed aside this concern through pure ipse dixit. 8 
Second, the Justices themselves bore substantial responsibility for 
the Florida Supreme Court's failure to specify substandards for gaug­
ing "intent of the voter." In its first foray into the 2000 Presidential 
election, the U.S. Supreme Court cautioned the Florida Supreme 
Court that the latter should hew closely to the letter of Florida stat­
utes, lest it be found to usurp the role of the Florida legislature under 
Article II, section 1, clause 2 of the Constitution and 3 U.S.C. § 5.9 By 
the time the case made it back to the U.S. Supreme Court less than a 
week later, only three Justices were willing to endorse this view,10 but 
by then the damage had been done. The Florida Supreme Court had 
been intimidated into ordering a recount under the unembellished 
statutory standard of "intent of the voter." This time the Florida court 
was reversed for failing to gloss the statute. Heads Bush wins; tails 
Gore loses - or so it appeared. 
Third, and perhaps least justifiably, the U.S. Supreme Court de­
termined that the counting had to cease at midnight, December 12, 
2000, barely two hours after it issued its decision. The Court located 
this deadline in what it termed the Florida Supreme Court's statement 
"that the [state] legislature intended the State's electors to 'partici­
pat[ e] fully in the federal electoral process,' "11 by taking advantage of 
the safe harbor 3 U.S.C. § 5 provides against challenges in Congress. 
Yet Florida's statutes nowhere stated a preference for the safe harbor 
deadline over an accurate count, nor did the Florida Supreme Court 
ever attribute such a preference to it.12 Even Florida Supreme Court 
Justice Shaw, who dissented from his court's December 8 decision or-
7. For example, the optical-scanner vote-counting system used in forty-one of Florida's 
sixty-seven counties resulted in only a 0.3% undervote rate, compared to a 1.5% rate in 
counties using punch card ballots. See Brief for Respondent at 43, Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (No. 00-
949); Pet. App., Exh. A, submitted with petition in Touchston v. McDermott (Dec. 8, 2000); 
Touchston v. McDermott, 234 F.3d 1133, 1140 n.16 (11th Cir. 2000). 
8. See Gore, 531 U.S. at 109 ("The question before the Court is not whether local enti­
ties, in the exercise of their expertise, may develop different systems for implementing elec­
tions."). 
9. See Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000). 
10. See Gore, 531 U.S. at 112 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by Scalia and Thomas, JJ.). 
11. Id. at 113 (per curiam opinion) (quoting Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. 
Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273, 1289 (Fla. 2000)); see also Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. 
Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 2000). · 
" 
12. The language quoted by the U.S. Supreme Court appeared in a discussion of the 
Florida Secretary of State's authority to reject late election returns. 
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dering manual recounts, later opined that "December 12  was not a 
'drop-dead' date under Florida law."13 Thus, on the question of re­
count standards, three of the Justices in the 5-4 Bush v. Gore majority 
were unwilling to accord the Florida Supreme Court anything like the 
deference state courts customarily receive as expositors of state law. 
On the critical deadline question, however, they were willing to defer 
to a decision the Florida Supreme Court never made, interpreting 
Florida statutory text that did not exist. 
The high stakes and the unpersuasiveness of the reasons given by 
the Supreme Court for its decision in Bush v. Gore have led many ob­
servers to conclude that the case cannot be understood in anything but 
political terms.14 By "political," the Court's critics do not merely mean 
that the Justices voted on the basis of their values or ideologies rather 
than in accord with neutral principles. There are, after all, numerous 
instances of Justices adopting one principle in one set of cases and its 
opposite in another. Most prominently, the Court's conservatives at­
tack judicial activism in the service of reproductive rights,15 gay 
rights,16 and church-state separation,17 while practicing judicial activ­
ism in the service of states' rights,18 colorblindness,19 and associational 
freedom.20 And the liberals practice judicial activism in cases involving 
the first set of issues while attacking it in cases involving the second 
set.21 But it is at least possible to articulate a vision of the Constitution 
that sanctions greater judicial solicitude for one constellation of values 
than for another. By contrast, in Bush v. Gore, the Justices appeared 
to strain legal logic in the service of a particular candidate for office 
rather than in the service of a larger constitutional vision. 
Many difficult questions of constitutional law have no single, obvi­
ously correct answer. Should the limits on Congress's power be en­
forceable by courts, and if so, what are those limits? Do courts have 
13. See Gore v. Harris, 773 So. 2d, 524 (Fla. 2000). When Elections Go Bad does not in­
clude the Florida Supreme Court's response to the U.S. Supreme Court's remand in Bush v. 
Gore. 
14. See 673 Law Professors Say, at http://www.the-rule-of-law.com/statement.html (last 
visited July 11, 2001) (accusing the Bush v. Gore majority of "acting as political proponents 
for candidate Bush, not judges"). 
15. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 953 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
16. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
17. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 318 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., dis­
senting); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000). 
18. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 
528 U.S. 62 (2000); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
19. See Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
20. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000); Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 
530 U.S. 567 (2000). 
21. See Michael. C. Dorf, No Federalists Here: Anti-Federalism and Nationalism on the 
Rehnquist Court, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 741, 746-48 (2000). 
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the power to enforce rights not expressly spelled out in the Constitu­
tion's text, and if so, which rights? (The right to choose abortion? The 
right to exclude homosexuals from private associations?) Does af­
firmative action remedy violations of the Equal Protection Clause, or 
does it actually violate the Clause? In the wake of legal realism, it 
would be foolish to suggest that anyone could answer such questions 
without relying in some measure on his or her own somewhat subjec­
tive value judgments. 
Yet, as I often tell my students as they are studying for exams, the 
fact that a question has no single right answer does not mean that it 
. has no wrong answers. Constitutional provisions, statutes, and prece­
dents rule out certain results, even as they leave open a range of le­
gitimate results. The constitutionality of some forms of affirmative ac­
tion and school vouchers are open questions; the constitutionality of 
slavery and an official church of the United States are not. The prob­
lem with Bush v. Gore is not that the Court made a poor choice among 
a range of legitimate options. The problem is that the Court appeared 
to choose a result from almost completely outside that range. For this 
reason, the case is an awkward vehicle for exploring the general 
problem of judicial review of elections, or anything else. 
To reiterate, I am not adding my name to the list of those who 
have accused the Court of partisanship. Who can ever know another's 
true motives, or even his own? Intriguingly, two of the authors of 
When Elections Go Bad have written separate essays that locate Bush 
v. Gore in lines of cases with a less partisan.bent,22 and undoubtedly 
the Justices saw themselves as simply performing their duty .. Yet the 
pure heart defense only goes so far. Ultimately, the Court must be 
judged by its deeds, not its motives. 
II. ORGANIZATION 
When Elections Go Bad fills a gap in the authors' casebook, The 
Law of Democracy.23 The latter "focused more on institutional ar­
rangements than on the nuts-and-bolts of casting votes and having 
them counted" (p. 2). The organization of When Elections Go Bad 
suggests that it is intended either as an extended supplement for a 
course in election law or as a stand-alone work on the law of the cast­
ing, counting, and litigating of votes. But the book's content and its 
timing - published less than a month after the Supreme Court's rul-
22. See Pamela S. Karlan, Nothing Personal: The Newest Equal Protection from Shaw v. 
Reno to Bush v. Gore, 34 N.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2001); Richard H. Pildes, Democracy 
and Disorder, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 695 (2001). 
23. SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF 
THE POLITICAL PROCESS (1998). A second edition of the principal casebook will be avail­
able soon. It incorporates an updated version of When Elections Go Bad as a single chapter: 
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ing in Bush v. Gore - make the book especially useful as a tool for 
understanding the legal issues in the 2000 Presidential election. 
Nevertheless, the authors have followed the usual course for case­
books, organizing the material thematically. The book consists of a 
short foreword followed by four chapters: (1) The Federal Interest in 
Election Procedures; (2) When Should Federal Courts Intervene?; (3) 
The State Interest in Federal Elections; and (4) Remedial Possibilities 
for Defective Elections. 
Throughout the book, the authors use the 2000 Presidential elec­
tion to illustrate more general points about election law, but this 
seems backwards. Ordinarily, the case method of legal instruction uses 
individual cases to illustrate general propositions, because it is under­
stood that the general propositions are more important than any par­
ticular application. Not so here, where one application dwarfs all oth­
ers. For example, even assuming that punch card ballots remain in use 
for some substantial period, any future dispute over whether dimpled 
chads should count as votes is extremely unlikely to have anything like 
the significance it had in the 2000 Presidential election. The same is 
true of nearly every hotly contested issue in the postelection contro­
versy. 
For telling the legal story of the 2000 Presidential election, a 
chronological organization might have served better.24 For one thing, it 
would have revealed just how much of the problem in Florida was due 
to the U.S. Supreme Court's mishandling of the case. In light of what 
came next, the Court's worst move may have been its initial decision 
to deny certiorari on then-Governor Bush's proposed third question: 
"Whether the use of arbitrary, standardless and selective manual re­
counts" violates the Fourteenth Amendment.25 Nearly three weeks 
elapsed between the certiorari denial and the Court's eventual ruling 
in Bush's favor on just that question.26 Had the Court handled the case 
more expeditiously from the start, there might have been time for a 
recount, even under the Court's stringent standard and made-up 
deadline.27 
There is a certain logic to the postelection litigation as presented in 
When Elections Go Bad that belies the wild unpredictability of the 
postelection litigation process as it was experienced in real time. As I 
24. The second edition will be organized more or less chronologically. 
25. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Katherine Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 2000), 
petition for cert. filed sub nom. George W. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 2000 
U.S. Briefs 836 (LEXIS) (U.S. Nov. 22, 2000) (No. 00-836). 
26. George W. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 1004, 1004 (2001) 
("Petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Florida granted on Questions 1 and 
2 as presented by the petition."). 
27. See Michael C. Dorf, Supreme Court Pulled a Bait and Switch, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 14, 
2000, at Bll. 
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have just noted, the Court's initial denial of review on the third certio­
rari question was, at the time, a partial defeat for Bush, although by 
dragging matters out it ended up immensely aiding him. Likewise, 
when the Florida Supreme Court ruled that Florida Secretary of State 
Katherine Harris lacked the discretion to exclude delayed returns 
from the certified total,28 the decision was· viewed as a major victory 
for Gore.29 Yet that decision ended up proving ruinous to his case for 
two reasons. First, by extending the protest phase of postelection 
challenges, the decision necessarily shortened the contest phase, thus 
enabling the U.S. Supreme Court to invoke the December 12 "dead­
line" at a point at which it was too late for anything to be done. Sec­
ond, in order to find that Harris was obligated to accept late returns, 
the Florida Supreme Court needed to construe Florida statutes crea­
tively - and its willingness to do so may have led five Justices of the 
U.S. Supreme Court to view all of the output of the Florida high court 
with extreme suspicion.30 
III. HIGHLIGHTS OF WHEN ELECTIONS GO BAD 
The two greatest strengths of When Elections Go Bad are the 
authors' illuminating notes and questions and the primary materials 
the book collects, including some marvelous tidbits. 
My favorite passage is a quotation of Senator Sherman, the princi­
pal supporter of the 1886 Electoral Count Act, which includes the 
now-infamous 3 U.S.C. § 5. Explaining why Congress was the appro­
priate body to resolve a future dispute of the sort that arose in the 
Presidential election of 1876, Senator Sherman stated that he had con­
sidered lodging this power in the Supreme Court, but concluded that 
this would be unwise. He presciently explained: 
It would be a very grave fault indeed and a very serious objection to refer 
a political question in which the people of the country were aroused, 
about which their feelings were excited, to this great tribunal, which after 
28. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 772 So. 2d at 1237 ("[W]e conclude that the 
authority of the Florida Secretary of State to ignore amended returns submitted by a County 
Canvassing Board may be lawfully exercised only under limited circumstances."). 
29. See, e.g., Dan Baiz & Peter Slevin, Fla. Justices Say Vote Totals Must Include Hand 
Recounts: Court Sets Deadline, Overrules Harris, WASH. POST, Nov. 22, 2000, at AOl; Joe 
Battenfeld & David R. Guarino, Count On! Court OKs Hand Recounts, Boosting Gore's 
Chances, BOSTON HERALD, Nov. 22, 2000, at 001; Jim Drinkard, Florida Supreme Court 
Allows Hand Recounts: Momentous Ruling a Victory for Gore: Bush May Appeal, USA 
TODAY, November 22, 2000, at lA; Jan Crawford Greenburg, Florida Judges Put People's 
Right to Vote Above All Else, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 22, 2000, at Nl. 
30. Another surprising tum of events came after President Bush took office, when one 
of the early journalist-conducted recounts revealed that he would have won a recount con­
ducted under the Florida Supreme Court's standard, whereas Gore would have won under 
the standard advocated by Bush, albeit by only three (three!) votes. See Martin Merzer, Re­
view Shows Ballots Say Bush, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 4, 2001, at Al. 
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all has to sit upon the life and property of all the people of the United 
States. It would tend to bring that court into public odium of one or the 
other of the two great parties.31 
To similar effect is Fourth Circuit Judge Wilkinson's explanation 
in a 1986 case denying a civil RICO claim for damages brought by un­
successful candidates for state and federal offices in West Virginia. Af­
ter noting that the House of Representatives had then recently exer­
cised its power to resolve .a disput,e concerning the election of one of 
its members, he stated: 
The partisan and acrimonious nature of that debate only reaffirms the 
wisdom of avoiding judicial embroilment and of leaving disputed politi­
cal outcomes to the legislative branch. Had the framers wished the fed­
eral judiciary to umpire election contests, they could have so provided. 
Instead, they reposed primary trust in popular representatives and in po­
litical correctives.32 
Through their notes and questions, Issacharoff, Karlan, and Pildes 
sometimes suggest that they agree with Senator Sherman, Judge 
Wilkinson, and the original Framers that federal courts should not 
adjudicate after-the-fact election disputes, except perhaps as a last re­
sort. Yet that proposition is hardly obvious. As Senator Sherman him­
self observed, even in the nineteenth century, other democratic coun­
tries routinely assigned this function to their courts.33 In modern times, 
most democracies have seen fit to insulate the electoral process itself 
from politics by granting extensive powers to independent commis­
sions and courts.34 As a matter of first-order institutional design, this 
may well be the better approach. 
31. P. 62(quoting 17 CONG. REC. 817-18 (1886) (statement of Sen. Sherman)). 
32. P. 165 (quoting Hutchinson v. Miller, 797 F.2d 1279, 1284 (4th Cir. 1986)). 
33. P. 62 (quoting 17 CONG. REC. 817-18 (1886) (statement of Sen. Sherman) ("I be­
lieve, however, that it is the provision made in other countries.")). 
34. Consider four examples, from the dozens that could be cited: 
1) Elections Canada is "an independent, non-partisan agency reporting directly to Canada's 
Parliament." The agency "is ... responsible for conducting federal general elections, by­
elections and referendums." What We Do, at http://www.elections.ca/content.asp?section= 
eca&document=abo&lang=e&textonly=false (last modified Nov. 22, 2000). 
2) India's 1947 Constitution created the Election Commission of India, an independent body 
whose members are appointed by parliament, serve for fixed, six-year terms, and are remov­
able only through impeachment. The Commission oversees voter and candidate eligibility, 
party registration, funding, balloting, and vote counting for the world's largest democracy. 
See Election Com mission of India, at http://www.eci.gov.in/infoeci/about_eci/abouteci_ 
fs.htm (last visited July 18, 2001 ). 
3) The Australian Electoral Commission is another independent body charged with the 
oversight of democratic elections. The Commission 
is responsible for conducting all aspects of a national election. It maintains the electoral rolls 
and enforces the compulsory enrolment; promotes public awareness of electoral and parlia­
mentary matters; conducts research into electoral matters; publishes materials relating to the 
election procedures; and reports to the Minister on electoral matters . . . .  The regulation of 
elections and election campaigns by the commission is for the purpose of not only producing 
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As a descriptive matter, however, Issacharoff, Karlan, and Pildes 
are surely correct. Our Federal Election Commission is a very weak 
body with jurisdiction limited to enforcement of ineffective campaign 
finance laws,35 and, Bush v. Gore notwithstanding, Congress, rather 
than the Supreme Court, has primary responsibility for refereeing dis­
putes over the outcome of federal elections. 
This is not to say that American courts previously played no role in 
resolving elections. State courts in particular played a substantial one, 
even in federal elections. In its chapter on remedies, When Elections 
Go Bad gives two spectacular examples. 
In one, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court examined the 
punch card ballots in a Congressional primary, counted dimpled chads 
under an intent-of-the-voter standard, and concluded that the candi­
date who had trailed by 175 votes after a machine count netted 376 
votes, thus winning the election.36 In another, a California appellate 
court overruled a trial court because the latter had erroneously ap­
proved the inclusion in the total balloting of the vote of one citizen 
who had recently moved. Because that citizen had testified that he had 
voted in favor of the contested ballot initiative, his vote was subtracted 
from the total yes vote. Where the machine count had produced a two­
vote defeat of the initiative, and the trial court had converted that re-
equitable distribution with regard to represc;mtation, but also to encourage fairness in the 
competition process. This involves providing for neutral election officials, enforcing the laws 
against bribery, and misleading advertisements, and the regulation of financing for elections. 
Robert L. Nay, Australia, in CAMPAIGN FINANCING OF NATIONAL ELECTIONS IN FOREIGN 
COUNTRIES, 25, 25-38 (Law Library of Congress ed., 1991) [hereinafter FOREIGN 
COUNTRIES]. 
4) Japan's electoral laws are arguably the strongest of any modem democracy, but there is 
no independent agency charged with enforcing those laws. Sung Yoon Cho, Japan, in 
FOREIGN COUNTRIES, supra, at 126 ("Japanese election campaigns, including campaign fi­
nancing, are governed by a set of comprehensive laws that are the most restrictive among 
democratic nations."). Japan's courts, however, are given wide latitude to enforce election 
laws. See The Political Funds Control Law of 1948, Law. No. 194 of 1948, as last amended by 
Law No. 81 of 1982; Public Office Election Law of 1950, Law. No. 100 of 1950, as last 
amended by Law No. 94 of 1988. 
35. See BROOKS JACKSON, BROKEN PROMISE: WHY THE FEDERAL ELECTION 
COMMISSION FAILED 2 (1990) ("The FEC's weak enforcement has made the campaign fi­
nance laws a fraud on the public."); GREG D. KUBIAK, THE GILDED DOME: THE UNITED 
STATES SENATE AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 229 (1994); Carol Mallory & Elizabeth 
Hedlund, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, ENFORCING THE CAMPAIGN FINANCE 
LAWS: AN AGENCY MODEL 1-5 (1993) (criticizing current FEC enforcement for weak and 
ineffective procedures and presenting alternative model campaign finance enforcement 
agency); Colloquy, Election Campaign Finance Reform: Federal Election Comm ission Panel 
Discussion: Problems and Possibilities, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 223 (1994) (discussing short­
comings of FEC processes); Kenneth A. Gross, The Enforcement of Campaign Finance 
Rules: A System in Search of Reform, 9 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 279 (1991) (criticizing cur­
rent FEC compliance mechanisms and providing recommendations for improving FEC en­
forcement); Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance 
Reform, 77 TEXAS L. REV. 1705, 1711 (1999). 
36. See Delahunt v. Johnston, 423 Mass. 731 (1996), reprinted at pp. 126-28. 
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suit into a one-vote victory, the appeals court found a tie, meaning the 
initiative failed. 37 
Although elections this close are no doubt unusual, it is precisely 
the close elections that lead to calls for recounts, and Issacharoff, 
Karlan, and Pildes describe the Massachusetts case, at least, as "fairly 
typical" (p. 126). They also describe manual recounts performed by 
the United States Senate that aimed to discern "the true intent of the 
voter," including a partial r,ecount . in 1974 (p. 27). Given such prece­
dents, the Bush v. Gore majority's consternation in the face of un­
guided discretion in the counting of punch card ballots is rather mysti­
fying. Were all of these prior recounts under similarly general criteria 
also unconstitutional? The Court did not say. 
While much of the material presented in When Elections Go Bad 
undermines the arguments made by the Supreme Court in Bush v. 
Gore, the book opens with a line of precedent that arguably supports 
the Court. The first principal case is a 1995 Eleventh Circuit decision 
in which the court found a violation of due process where, in an elec­
tion for state offices, an Alabama court counted absentee ballots that 
had not been notarized or properly witnessed as required by Alabama 
election law.38 The court ruled that such .a "retroactive change" vio­
lated "fundamental fairness."39 As Issacharoff, Karlan, and Pildes ob­
serve, this very broad view of the role of federal courts with respect to 
state election law explains "why lawyers for the Bush campaign 
pressed so ardently to draw the Eleventh Circuit into the Florida dis­
pute" (p. 10). Yet even as the case casts light on the Bush litigation 
strategy, it poses a puzzle about the Supreme Court's behavior: Why 
did those Justices who ruled for Bush rely on unprecedented (and un­
persuasive) views of equal protection and Article II, when they might 
have invoked seemingly apposite due process precedent from the very 
circuit that encompasses Florida? 
Through their questions and comments, lssacharoff, Karlan, and 
Pildes suggest an answer: the Eleventh Circuit's own rule would be un­
tenable if generally applied because it would threaten to federalize 
every question of state election law. In the Alabama case itself, the 
federal district court and Eleventh Circuit detected a clear break with 
prior consistent practice; by contrast, prior to the 2000 election, 
Florida's election laws had not been applied to a statewide electoral 
contest in over eighty years (pp. 17-20). Thus, a federal court judg­
ment that Florida had departed from its own laws would have rested 
on nothing but a disposition to read Florida statutes differently from 
37. See Escalante v. City of Hermosa Beach, 241 Cal. Rptr. 199 (1987), reprinted at p. 
128. 
38. See Roe v. Alabama, 43 F.3d 574 (11th Cir. 1995), reprinted at pp. 11-15. 
39. Id. at 581, reprinted at p. 12. 
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the Florida courts. As lssacharoff, Karlan, and Pildes ask rhetorically, 
"if the federal courts can do no more than simply issue their own in­
terpretations of how· best to read state law, can such a difference of 
view ever rise to the level of the 'patent' unfairness that is required for 
a federal constitutional interest in the process?" (p. 20). 
This is a fair criticism. A U.S. Supreme Court opinion relying on 
the Eleventh Circuit's due process rule would have been unjustifiable. 
Yet it would have been no more unjustifiable than the actual decision 
in Bush v. Gore, for the equal protection standard the majority an­
nounced also threatens to inject a federal issue into every state elec­
tion. Similarly, it is no less arbitrary for a federal court to substitute its 
reading of state law for that of the state courts under the nominal aus­
pices of Article II - as three Justices did in Bush v. Gore - than un­
der the Due Process Clause. 
Perhaps the majority Justices relied on Article II and equal protec­
tion rather than due process because of the haste with which they 
needed to decide the case and issue their opinion. Bush v. Gore was 
handed down less than two days after it was argued. By way of com­
parison, even working at lightning speed, Issacharoff, Karlan, and 
Pildes took nearly two weeks from the date of the decision until they 
submitted their final manuscript to the publisher, whereas I spent a 
leisurely two and a half months working on this Essay, and the editors 
of the Michigan Law Review spent a still longer period editing it and 
checking citations. Given this upside-down allocation of time, it is not 
surprising that the Court's chosen legal theories do not survive close 
scrutiny. 
In any event, to fault the Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore for pick­
ing one rather than another unconvincing doctrinal explanation for its 
decision misses the point. By December 12, 2001, five Justices appar­
ently believed that the Florida Supreme Court was determined to 
throw the nation into chaos rather than to let a Bush victory stand, 
and that they alone could rescue us. But the Court's conventions did 
not permit it to invoke such frankly pragmatic considerations, leaving 
it only inadequate doctrinal grounds to justify its action.40 
40. I do not mean to suggest that the Court's hypothesized concern about stability was 
warranted. Had a recount left Bush in the lead, that would have been the end of the matter. 
Had Gore overtaken Bush, political pressure might have.forced a Bush concession, and if it 
had not, there is no reason to think that Congressional resolution of the election would have 
threatened the nation's stability. My point is that if the Court was "taking a bullet" for the 
country, it should have said so. But cf RICHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: 
THE 2000 ELECTION, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS (2001) Uustifying Bush v. Gore 
on pragmatic grounds wholly unexpressed by the per curiam or concurring opinion). 
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IV. LESSONS 
What lessons can we learn from the 2000 Presidential election? In 
the heat of the moment, many legal commentators viewed the pos­
telection saga as merely confirming their prior views. 
For Cass Sunstein, the Supreme Court's initial unanimous per 
curiam remand to the Florida Supreme Court was a wisely "minimal­
ist" decision.41 This was a spectacularly poor assessment. By papering 
over internal divisions with an opinion that falsely suggested there 
were five Justices prepared to base their decision on a nonretroactivity 
principle rooted in Article II and 3 U.S.C. § 5, the minimalist character 
of the opinion wasted precious time and trapped the Florida high 
court.42 
For Jeffrey Toobin, the postelection litigation confirmed his view 
that the legal system and the political system had merged - for the 
worse.43 Toobin had previously identified that merger as the root 
problem with the events leading up to President Clinton's impeach­
ment.44 Yet in an important respect, the phenomena are almost polar 
opposites. In the impeachment iSaga, the Supreme Court stood by 
while politically motivated actors used the legal system for political 
gain.45 In the postelection litigation, the Supreme Court prevented 
both the state legal system and the state and national legal and politi­
cal systems from performing the roles assigned to them. Far from the 
culmination of a longstanding trend, Bush v. Gore was a shock to 
many of the most seasoned Court-watchers precisely because it ap­
peared to be political. Had law and politics really already merged in 
the way that Toobin claims, Bush v. Gore would have been under­
stood as simply business as usual. 
In some sense, of course, Bush v. Gore was consistent with prior 
Rehnquist Court opinions. As Larry Kramer wrote in the wake of the 
Court's 5-4 decision to stay the manual recount but before its final 
ruling, "conservative judicial activism is the order of the day. The 
Warren Court was retiring compared to the present one."46 The point 
41. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT (1996); see also 
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME 
COURT (1999); Cass R. Sunstein, The Broad Virtue in a Modest Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 
2000, at A29; Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term - Foreword: Leaving Things 
Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1996). 
42. See supra text accompanying notes 9-10; see also Dorf, supra note 27. 
43. See Jeffrey Toobin, The Counting House: Have the Presidency and Litigation Be­
come Permanently Entwined?, NEW YORKER, Dec. 4, 2000, at 42. 
44. See JEFFREY TOO BIN, A v AST CONSPIRACY: THE REAL STORY OF THE SEX 
SCANDAL THAT NEARLY. BROUGHT DOWN A PRESIDENT (1999). 
45. See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997). 
46. Larry D. Kramer, No Surprise. It's an Activist Court, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2000, at 
A33. 
May 2001] The 2000 Presidential Election 1291 
is a fair one,47 but neither the initial stay nor the ultimate disposition in 
Bush v. Gore was conservative in the conventional sense. By contrast, 
some of the Court's most activist, conservative decisions have actually 
frustrated the institutional interests of the Republican Party. Most 
prominently, the majority-minority districts that were invalidated by 
Shaw v. Reno48 and its progeny were frequently created with the 
blessing of southern Republicans who hoped to "pack" African 
Americans into such districts,' thereby dili.Iting the strength of the 
Democratic Party in the remaining districts.49 Whatever one thinks of 
the Rehnquist Court's activist pursuit of colorblind electoral district­
ing, it is activism in the service of a principle, not a party. 
The authors of When Elections Go Bad do not entirely escape the 
tendency of other commentators to see in the 2000 Presidential elec­
tion a confirmation of their previously held views. The tendency is less 
pronounced, however, because the substantive views of the book's 
authors - who undoubtedly disagree among themselves on some key 
questions - are not entirely obvious. Indeed, writing in these pages 
two years ago, Burt Neuborne criticized Issacharoff, Karlan, and 
Pildes for failing to develop a normative account of democracy.50 
Yet, as Neuborne's own review illustrates, the authors' first book 
did embrace a more limited theory, one of the proper role of courts in 
policing the democratic process. Neuborne thought that too much of 
the first book was devoted to the legal mechanisms by which minority 
voters may challenge electoral practices.51 This focus on the rights of 
minority voters is hardly disproportionate given the theory implicit in 
both The Law of Democracy and When Elections Go Bad - broadly 
speaking, the theory of the Carolene Products footnote,52 the Warren 
47. In my view, conservative and liberal judicial activism is the order of the day. See 
Michael C. Dorf, They Are All Activists Now, at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/ 
2000 501.html (May 1, 2000). 
48. 509 U.S. 630 (1993). 
49. See ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 23, at 582: ("Republicans were delighted to 
pack pro-Democratic minority voters into new majority-minority districts, thereby drawing 
away from the electoral strength of Democratic incumbents."). For a more cynical view of 
most of the output of the Rehnquist Court, see Mark V. Tushnet, A Repub lican Chief 
Justice, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1326, 1328 (1990) (reviewing SUE DA VIS, JUSTICE REHNQUIST 
AND THE CONSTITUTION (1989)) ("One could account for perhaps ninety percent of Chief 
Justice Rehnquist's bottom-line results by looking, not at anything in the United States Re­
ports, but rather at the platforms of the Republican Party."). 
50. Burt Neubome, Making the Law Safe for Democracy: A Review of "The Law of 
Democracy Etc.", 97 MICH. L. REV. 1578, 1589-90 (1999) (book review) (complaining that 
the book "purports to deal with the law of democracy without engaging in a normative in­
quiry as to what conception of democracy the courts should seek to defend"). 
51. See id. at 1584-85 (discussing the pre-clearance mechanism of section 5 of the Voting 
Rights Act). 
52. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
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Court, and John Hart Ely's Democracy and Distrust.53 In a nutshell, 
courts can and should take action to assist democracy, but only when 
the democratic process cannot cure its own defects. And that circum­
stance is most likely to obtain when political divisions reflect racial 
ones. 
Seen from this vantage point, the Supreme Court's decision in 
Bush v. Gore was wrong because it was unnecessary. The Electoral 
Count Act meant that Congress could have resolved the matter with­
out judicial interference. Although lssacharoff, Karlan, and Pildes do 
not say so explicitly, their account also suggests that the Florida 
Supreme Court erred in ordering manual recounts given they believe 
that the Florida legislature was prepared to resolve the issue. 
V. AN ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATION 
Like the classical process theory of Carotene Products, Earl War­
ren, and John Hart Ely, the implicit process theory of The Law of 
Democracy and When Elections Go Bad envisions a circumscribed 
role for judges. It is not that Issacharoff, Karlan, and Pildes trust poli­
ticians. As they state very early in When Elections Go Bad, "[t]here is 
little reason to believe that partisan officials will cease to be that if 
they are given the chance to interpret or even alter the rules of the 
game after the election has occurred" (p. 3). 
The problem for the authors of When Elections Go Bad is that 
"just as the partisan effects of all potential courses of action are known 
to partisan political officials, so too are they known to judges who 
must adjudicate electoral challenges. The adjudication of claims that 
will alter the outcomes of high-profile elections threatens significant 
damage to the integrity of courts" (p. 3). Given the choice between 
two flawed sets of institutions, why not have a strong presumption that 
matters should be left to the politicians, whose judgments are at least 
subject to review in the political process? That rhetorical question is 
the subtext of When Elections Go Bad.54 
53. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
(1980). Of course, the authors of When Elections Go Bad disagree with Ely on various par­
ticulars, see, e.g. , Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Comm entary: Standing and Mis­
understanding in Voting Rights Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2276 (1998), but on the whole their 
work is sympathetic to the project of selectively using judicial power to bolster democracy. 
See, e. g. , ISACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 23, at 11-12 ("When politicians who have been 
elected under one set of rules are asked to change the existing rules, there might be good 
reason to distrust their incentives."); Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics As 
Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 709-10 (1998) 
(extending "Ely's pioneering work"). 
54. The authors' skepticism of federal judicial intervention is most apparent in their 
notes and questions on the demise of abstention doctrines in federal court decisions involv­
ing elections. Pp. 57-62. 
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But do the facts of the 2000 Presidential election controversy really 
support the view that politicians are no worse than judges in referee­
ing electoral disputes? From the very beginning of the Florida recount 
imbroglio, elected officials consistently took whatever positions would 
advance the interest of their party's candidate. The Democratic 
Attorney General supported the Gore campaign.55 The Republican 
Secretary of State supported the Bush campaign: first she denied that 
she had any discretion to accept late votes;56 then when instructed that 
she had such discretion, she categorically declined to exercise it;57 and 
finally, when instructed that the categorical denial was abusive, she 
rigidly enforced a deadline so as to minimize Gore votes.58 
More ominously, the Florida legislature was fully prepared to take 
a party-line vote that would have given the state's electors to Bush, re­
gardless of the result of any court-ordered recount.59 We do not know 
to a certainty that Congress would have acted in a similarly partisan 
55. See, e. g . ,  Don Van Natta, Jr. & David Barstow, Counting the Vote: The Canvassing 
Boards: Election Officials Focus of Lobbying From Both Camps, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2000, 
at Al ("[I]n Volusia County, the only Florida county to complete a full hand recount, the 
state's attorney general, Robert A. Butterworth, placed an unsolicited phone call a week ago 
to elections officials, advising them that they had the legal authority to go forward with a 
manual recount."); Mireya Navarro, Counting the Vote: The Attorney General: A Staunch 
Gore Ally Influences Florida Ballot Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2000, at A27. 
56. Press Release, Katherine Harris, Statement of Katherine Harris, Secretary of State 
(Nov. 13, 2000), available at http://election2000.stanford.edu/flll-14deadline.pdf (last visited 
May 11, 2001) ("In order to effectuate the public's right to clarity and finality, the law unam­
biguously states when the process of counting and recounting the votes cast on election day 
must end." Ms. Harris claimed that the only discretion provided by the law is for emergen­
cies such as hurricanes. An unusually close election, she said, is not an emergency.); see also 
Alan Judd, Florida Official Refuses to Extend Vote Deadline: Gore Team Decries "Arb itrary" 
Decision, ATLANTA]. & CONST., Nov. 13, 2000, at lA. 
57. Katherine Harris, Remarks denying county requests to add hand-counted ballot to­
tals (Nov. 15, 2000), available at http://election2000.stanford.edu/harris11_15_deny.html (last 
accessed May 11, 2001); see also Richard L. Berke, Counting the Votes: The Overview: Re­
publican Rejects Offer that 2 Sides Accept a Count by Hand, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2000, at 
Al ("Ms. Harris . . .  announced . . .  that it was 'my duty under Florida law' to reject requests 
from several counties to update their totals."). 
58. After ten days of counting over 400,000 ballots, Palm Beach County submitted its 
amended returns to Secretary Harris 78 minutes late. She refused to accept them, in a move 
characterized by canvassing board chairman Charles Burton as a "slap in the face." Todd J. 
Gillman, Palm Beach Comes up Just Short: Recount 78 Minutes Late: Vote Rejection Called 
"Slap," DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 27, 2000, at lA; Jeff Shields & Brad Hahn, Palm 
Beach County Misses Deadline, FT. LAUDERDALE SUN-SENTINEL, Nov. 27, 2000, at lA. 
59. JOHN MCKAY & TOM FEENEY, THE FLORIDA LEGISLATURE JOINT 
PROCLAMATION (Dec. 6, 2000), available at http://election2000.stanford.edu/ 
proclamation.pdf (last accessed May 11, 2001); see also David Barstow, Contesting the Vote: 
The Florida Legislature: Florida Lawmakers Moving to Bypass Courts for Bush: Judge Bars a 
Quick Recount, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2000, at Al. Candidate Bush's brother, Governor Jeb 
Bush, soon expressed his support for the plan. David Barstow & Somini Sengupta, Contest­
ing the Vote: The Florida Legislature: Florida Governor Backs Lawmakers' Efforts to Bypass 
Courts and Select Electors, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2000, at A27 (quoting Florida Governor 
Bush saying it would be an "act of courage" for the state legislature to name its own slate of 
electors). 
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fashion, but perhaps that is only because the Supreme Court denied 
Congress the opportunity. 
Although hardly above reproach, in general the courts did not act 
in quite so partisan a fashion as the politicians during the 2000 Presi­
dential election controversy. The Democratic trial judge who initially 
ruled that Secretary of State Harris had the discretion to certify late 
returns handed the Bush campaign a victory by subsequently ruling 
that she did not abuse her discretion in excluding those returns.60 The 
heavily Democratic Florida Supreme Court was accused of partisan­
ship for its decision reversing that judgment,61 but the Florida Supreme 
Court itself later split on whether to order manual recounts in the con­
test phase, and that split was not on party lines.62 Even the Florida 
Supreme Court Justices who sided with Gore ordered a remedy that 
was hardly certain to result in a victory for him - manual counting of 
"under-votes" in counties that went for Bush as well as those that 
went for Gore.63 
It is also worth noting that the U.S. Supreme Court Justices did not 
divide strictly on party lines. Republican appointees Stevens and 
Souter sided with Gore. In addition, although he would have ruled for 
Gore with respect to the remedy, Democratic appointee Breyer found 
some merit in Bush's equal protection argument.64 But even if one 
were willing to condemn the Court's majority for partisanship in Bush 
60. Compare McDermott v. Harris, No. 00-2700, 2000 WL 1693713 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 
14, 2000) (order granting in part and denying in part motion of temporary injunction), avail­
able at http://election2000.stanford.edu/McDermottHarris.pdf (last accessed May 11, 2001), 
with McDermott v. Harris, No. 00-2700, 2000 WL 1714590 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 17, 2000) (or­
der denying emergency motion to compel compliance with and for enforcement of injunc­
tion), available at http://election2000.stanford.edu/2700af.pdf (last accessed May 11, 2001). 
61. Bush spokesman (and former Secretary of State) James Baker was particularly 
harsh: "Two weeks after the election, (the Florida Supreme Court] has changed the rules, 
and has invented a riew system for counting the election results," he said at a news confer­
ence on November 22. Remarks by James Baker (Nov. 22, 2000), available at 
http://www.foxnews.com/election_night/112200/baker_statement.sml (last accessed May 11, 
2001) (criticizing Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 2000) 
(per curiam), reprinted at pp. 78-89). 
62. See Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 2000). The Florida Supreme Court split 4-3, 
with Justices Anstead, Pariente, Lewis, and Quince in the majority, see id. at 1247, and Chief 
Justice Wells, and Justices Harding and Shaw dissenting. See id. at 1262 (Wells, C.J., dis­
senting); id. at 1270 (Harding, J., dissenting). All seven justices were appointed to the 
Florida Supreme Court by Democratic governors: Chief Justice Wells and Justices Harding, 
Anstead, Pariente, Lewis, and Quice by Gov. Lawton Chiles, and Justice Shaw by Governor 
Bob Graham. (Quince's appointment was also sponsored by Governor Bush, whose term 
began shortly after the appointment.) 
63. Gore, 772 So. 2d at 1247. The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently criticized the 
Florida Supreme Court for not also ordering recounts of "overvotes." See Bush v. Gore, 531 
U.S. 98, 109 (2000). 
64. Bush, 531 U.S. at 145-46 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("The majority's (equal protection] 
concern does implicate principles of fundamental fairness . . .  I agree that, in these very spe­
cial circumstances, basic principles of fairness may well have counseled the adoption of a 
uniform standard to address the problem."). 
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v. Gore, it would not follow that courts lack any systematic advantage 
over politicians. Federal judges are insulated from political pressure 
by life tenure and salary protection, while independence is a cardinal 
judicial virtue at all levels. Of course, any institutional arrangement 
can be subverted by human failings. The key question is what are the 
odds. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The United States Constitution was flawed from the outset - not 
just morally flawed because it condoned slavery, but institutionally in­
complete because of the Framers' failure to anticipate the develop­
ment of political parties. The two-party system arose in the United 
States partly as a response to Duverger's Law,65 but also to fill a prac­
tical need. The Madisonian strategy of dividing power to prevent tyr­
anny carries with it a well-known concomitant danger of government 
paralysis,66 as each institution frustrates the will of the others. By facili­
tating coordination among the branches and levels of government, po­
litical parties reduce the risk of gridlock.67 
The original Constitution's mechanism for selecting a President 
quickly broke down in the face of political parties, leading to the 
deadlocked election of 1800. Although the Twelfth Amendment 
remedied the particular problem that had caused the deadlock, politi­
cal parties continue to fit awkwardly in our constitutional system. This 
awkwardness is apparent in cases involving the institutional interests 
of parties as such,68 as well as in the 2000 Presidential election contro­
versy. 
If elected bodies are assigned the task of adjudicating high-stakes 
partisan contests, there is a substantial risk that the political parties 
will capture the organs of government, converting the latter into mere 
agents of the former. Even if varied constituencies and shifting coali­
tions lead to bipartisan compromise on other issues, with respect to 
after-the-fact adjudication of close elections, party discipline will be 
the order of the day. The risk of capture appears to have been realized 
65. Maurice Duverger postulated "that systems in which office is awarded to a candidate 
who receives the most votes . . .  in a single-ballot election will produce a two-party political 
system, rather than a multi-party one." ISACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 23, at 715. 
66. See WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 
200 (1908) ("[T]he danger of coordinate and coequal powers such as the framers of the 
Constitution had set up was that they might at their will pull in opposite directions and hold 
the government at a deadlock which no constitutional force could overcome."). 
67. Larry Kramer nicely illustrates how political parties coordinate policy between the 
state and federal levels. See Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political 
Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000). 
68. For example, in California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000), self­
declared textualist Antonin Scalia found himself relying on an unenumerated right of politi­
cal association to invalidate California's blanket primary. 
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in Florida, and likely would have also been realized at the national 
level, if given the chance. 
The resulting battle of institutions was not, however, a classic in­
stance of Madisonian checks and balances, but more nearly its oppo­
site. The Madisonian system of checks and balances depends upon 
government bodies pursuing discrete institutional interests rather than 
the interest of whichever party happens to control a given body. For 
example, even when the same party controls the Senate and the 
House, legislation frequently passes one body but founders in the 
other, because House and Senate members are elected for different 
terms, serve different constituencies, and develop cross-party working 
relationships with different colleagues. When parties capture the insti­
tutions, however, the only question that matters is which party con­
trols the institution with the final move. In the case of the 2000 Presi­
dential election, the answer to that question was almost certainly the 
Republican Party.69 
That answer is not in itself distressing, except to partisans. If party 
loyalty is ever going to take priority over institutional loyalty, it will be 
during partisan political contests. The problem arises because neither 
our Constitution nor our laws expressly provide for a neutral referee 
of partisan political contests. 
Given this gap, it was understandable that a clear majority of 
Americans thought that the United States Supreme Court was the 
only institution with the detachment and prestige to resolve the elec­
tion dispute impartially.70 That it proved incapable of doing so con-
69. The Electoral Count Act provides that in the event that a state names more than 
one slate of Presidential electors, each House of Congress must make a choice. See 3 U.S.C. 
§ 15 (2000). The Republican-controlled House almost certainly would have chosen the Bush 
electors while, assuming strict party discipline, the evenly divided Senate would have chosen 
the Gore electors by virtue of Gore's own tie-breaking vote. At that point, the election 
would have turned on which slate of electors bore the signature of the Florida executive, Jeb 
Bush. See id. 
70. In a Gallup poll conducted between August 29 and September 5, 2000, 62% of 
Americans claimed they "approve[d] of the way the Supreme Court is handling its job." 
Forty seven percent of those surveyed claimed to have a "great deal" or "quite a lot" of con­
fidence in the Supreme Court, compared to 46% for organized religion, 64% for the U.S. 
Military, 24% for Congress, 42% for the presidency, and 36% for the television news. Public 
Opinion of the Supreme Court, GALLUP NEWS SERVICE, at http://www.gallup.com/ 
poll/releases/pr001201b.asp (Dec. 1, 2000). Interestingly, Gallup noted a sharply increased 
partisan divide in public perception of the Supreme Court following the decision in Bush v. 
Gore: 
Those who identify as Democrats showed a slight drop in confidence in the Supreme Court 
between June and December, from 44% with 'a great deal' or 'quite a lot' of confidence 
during June, to 40% during December. Independents also showed a very slight loss of faith 
in the Supreme Court as well, from 48% to 45%. Republicans, however, showed a large in­
crease in confidence, from 48% during June to 67% during the days following the Supreme 
Court's decision in Bush v. Gore. In short, views of the nation's highest court became more 
politicized -at least in the short term - during the time period in which the court made the 
highly controversial decision that gave George W. Bush the presidency. 
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vincingly is not, as When Elections Go Bad perhaps implies, the prod­
uct of some institutional defect. The Supreme Court has, at other im­
portant junctures in history, played an important role in safeguarding 
American democracy.71 It can and will do so again. In the meantime, 
let us not throw out the baby with the bathwater. 
Jeffrey M. Jones, Opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court has Become More Po liticiz ed, GALLUP 
NEWS SERVICE, at http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/pr010103b.asp (Jan. 3, 2001). 
71. The unanimity of the desegregation decisions provides one important example. See, 
e. g. , Brown v. Bd. of Educ. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The Nixon tapes case is another. See United 
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
